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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 01-4512
___________
EDWARD ELWELL
Appellant
v.
PP&L, INC., formerly
PENNSYLVANIA POWER AND LIGHT, INC.
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. Civil No. 99-cv-2716)
District Judge:  The Honorable Franklin S. VanAntwerpen 
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2002
Before: ALITO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges and OBERDORFER*, District Judge
(Filed:   September 30, 2002)
* The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Judge for the District of
Columbia, sitting by designation. 
________________________
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OPINION OF THE COURT
________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Edward Elwell appeals the District Court’s grant of the motion for
reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment brought by his employer, Defendant PP
& L, Inc., and the denial of his motion for reconsideration of his motion for summary
judgment.  Because we agree with the District Court that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to his age discrimination claims, we affirm. 
I.  Facts and Procedural Background
The factual allegations underlying this case are well known to the parties, and therefore,
they are not detailed here, except to the extent that they directly bear upon the analysis.  Elwell
asserted age discrimination and retaliation claims against the Defendant pursuant to the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (ADEA) and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 955(a).  In his Complaint, Elwell alleged that,
beginning in 1995, when his position of Area Operations Manager was eliminated, and
continuing until the filing of his Complaint, the Defendant subjected him to an ongoing pattern
of discriminatory decision-making by demoting him and subsequently failing to hire and/ or
promote him to positions for which he was qualified.  Elwell alleged that, as a result, his salary
was reduced and was susceptible to further reduction.  Additionally, Elwell asserted that he
suffered adverse employment actions in retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Defendant moved for summary
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judgment as to all counts of Elwell’s complaint.
Initially, the District Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of its motion for summary
judgment, which the District Court granted in part and denied in part.  The court ruled that only
the last three positions for which Elwell applied could be considered.  These positions were
the Power Delivery Regional Work Manager, Supervising Engineer, and the Service Order
Fulfillment (SOF) Team Leader positions.  The court held that Elwell failed to establish a
prima facie claim as to the Power Delivery Regional Work Manager position because the
candidate selected for this position was but one year younger than Elwell.  As to the
Supervising Engineer and SOF Team Leader positions, the court held that Elwell did not
present evidence which successfully rebutted the nondiscriminatory reasons advanced by the
Defendant for the selection of other candidates for these positions.  Because it held that Elwell
failed to establish that any acts of discrimination occurred within the 300 day time window
preceding his filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, the court ruled that Elwell’s
claims arising out of employment decisions made prior to the 300 day period  could not be
brought under a continuing violations theory and were therefore time-barred.  The court
rejected Elwell’s claim of retaliation based on his employer’s failure to hire him for a Project
Manager position, ruling that Elwell presented a triable issue only as to whether he had
received a less favorable evaluation due to his filing an EEOC charge.
Thereafter, Elwell filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied in its
entirety.  In doing so, the court reversed its earlier holding that Elwell’s claim of
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discrimination arising out of Defendant’s failure to hire him for the Audit Team Leader
position was untimely.  The court held that Elwell’s claim pertaining to this position was timely
because a “mailbox rule” applied, and therefore the date that the charge was received by the
EEOC was not determinative.  The court nevertheless dismissed Elwell’s claim on the basis
that Elwell failed to show that he was qualified for the Audit Team Leader position and,
therefore, failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination arising out the selection
of another candidate for the position.  The court further held that, even if Elwell established
a prima facie case, no reasonable finder of fact could find that he was denied the position based
on age discrimination.
The court also revisited Elwell’s claim of age discrimination with respect to
Defendant’s decision not to hire him for the Power Delivery Regional Work Manager position.
The court held that, even assuming that Elwell could make out a prima facie case, i.e.,  even
though the candidate chosen for the job was merely one year younger than him, he did not
present evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that age discrimination
motivated the hiring decision.  The court declined to revisit its holding with respect to the
Supervising Engineer position.  After revisiting its analysis of why Elwell failed to establish
a triable issue arising out of another candidate’s selection for the SOF Team Leader position,
the District Court reiterated its previous ruling dismissing this claim. 
After a bench trial on Elwell’s retaliation claim which survived summary judgment,
Judge Rueter entered judgment in favor of Defendant.  Elwell does not challenge this judgment
on appeal.  Elwell appeals the District Court’s rulings that he could not sustain his age
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discrimination claims on the merits with respect to three of the positions for which he applied
and was rejected, namely the Audit Team Leader, Supervising Engineer, and SOF Team Leader
positions.  
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
pendent jurisdiction over Appellant’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“[T]he standard of review for a denial of a motion for reconsideration varies with the
nature of the underlying judicial decision.”  Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d
345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986).  Because this court is addressing the District Court’s rulings on
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, this Court has plenary review.  See id. at 349.
III.  Discussion
 Elwell asserts that the District Court erred in holding that he did not establish a prima
facie case with respect to the Audit Team Leader position and in holding that, even assuming
that he did, he failed to rebut the nondiscriminatory reasons advanced by Defendant with regard
to its hiring decision for this position as well as the Supervising Engineer and SOF Team
Leader positions.  Elwell asserts that the District Court  usurped the role of the jury by
improperly making credibility determinations regarding the  age discrimination evidence
submitted by the parties.  In response, Defendant asserts that, because Appellant failed to
present evidence in support of his age discrimination claims, the judgment of the District
Court should not be disturbed and this appeal should be denied.
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The parties essentially agree as to the controlling legal standards. In order to establish
a prima facie ADEA case, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he is over 40, (2) he is qualified for
the position in question, (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (4) he was
replaced by a sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age discrimination.”
Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 1995).  If the plaintiff is able to
establish a prima facie case, a presumption of age discrimination arises, which the employer
must rebut by providing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action.  See id.  “To defeat a summary judgment motion based on a defendant’s proffer of a
nondiscriminatory reason, a plaintiff who has made a prima facie showing of discrimination
need only point to evidence establishing a reasonable inference that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.”  Id.
A.  Audit Team Leader
The District Court held that, even assuming Elwell could establish a prima facie case
of age discrimination arising out of the selection of a younger candidate for the Audit Team
Leader position, this claim necessarily failed because Elwell did not present evidence which
would lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the reasons advanced by the Defendant were
pretextual.  Elwell asserts that, in arriving at its conclusion, the District Court improperly
weighed the evidence by reasoning that Defendant’s “subjective evidence” was more worthy
of credence than the “objective evidence” he introduced.  Appellant’s Br. at 11.  
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), the Supreme
Court held that a juror could “infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the
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employer’s explanation” absent the introduction of “additional, independent evidence of
discrimination.”  Reeves, 503 U.S. at 147-49.  The Court explained that:
[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient
evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is
false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated.  
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always
be adequate to sustain a jury’s finding of liability.  Certainly there
will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the
defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude
that the action was discriminatory.  For instance, an employer
would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record
conclusively revealed some other nondiscriminatory reason for
the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak
issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and
there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that
no discrimination had occurred. 
Id. at 148 (emphasis in original).  This is consistent with our earlier holding in Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), where we explained that:
because the factfinder may infer from the combination of the
plaintiff’s prima facie case and its own rejection of the
employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff and was
merely trying to conceal its illegal act with the articulated
reasons, a plaintiff who has made out a prima facie case may
defeat a motion for summary judgment by either (i) discrediting
the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii)
adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of the adverse employment action.  Thus, if
the plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficiently to discredit the
defendant’s proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment the
plaintiff need not also come forward with additional evidence of
discrimination beyond his or her prima facie case.
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Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  Defendant came forward
with the deposition testimony of Martin Urban, who was one of three employees of the
Defendant who interviewed Elwell for the Audit Team Leader position in February of 1997 and
was the person who made the decision to not hire Elwell.  Urban testified that he decided that
Elwell was not the best candidate for the Audit Team Leader position because a score of 3.0
was required for the position and he had interviewed him for a position entailing similar
responsibilities in a different area of the company in August of 1996, at which time Elwell
received a consensus score of 2.43 from the three interviewers.  In order to show that this
reason was but a pretext for discrimination, Elwell came forward with a “Synchrony Feedback”
evaluation of Elwell from August of 1996, in which he received a score of 4.2 for his
performance on his then current job.  The District Court correctly reasoned that, because there
was no evidence (1) that either Elwell’s score of 2.43 in the earlier interview for the similar
position or the requirement of a score of 3.0 were incorrect; or (2) that the level of
proficiency required to score 4.2 on the Synchrony Feedback evaluation was sufficient to
qualify for the Audit Team Leader position; or (3) that Elwell’s qualifications for his then
current job implied he was sufficiently qualified for a higher level position, a reasonable jury
could neither discredit Defendant’s reasons as pretextual nor find that age discrimination was
more likely than not a determinative factor in Defendant’s decision not to promote Elwell. 
The District Court properly rejected Elwell’s argument that it usurped the role of the
jury by weighing the Synchrony Evaluation against the consensus score.  As the District Court
explained,
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[c]redibility determinations are indeed the province of the trier of
fact.  On a motion for summary judgment, the court must accept
as true all reasonable inference that favor the nonmoving party.
However, we may only consider reasonable inferences; we may
not improperly consider those inferences that are unreasonable.
We have drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff.  
It remains our function, however, to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence for a claim to reach the trier of fact.
App. at 60-61 (citing 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2528 (2d ed. 1995), at 294) (emphasis in original).  Accordingly, we affirm the
District Court’s dismissal of Elwell’s claim for age discrimination arising out of the selection
of a younger candidate for the Audit Team Leader position. 
B.  Supervising Engineer
Similarly, Elwell’s claim of discrimination arising out of Defendant’s choice of another
candidate for the Supervising Engineer position, which Elwell applied for and was rejected
from without having the opportunity to interview, fails due to his failure to rebut the reasons
advanced by the Defendant for its hiring choice.  Elwell asserted that Douglas Krall, the PP &
L employee with hiring authority with respect to this position, could not have known that he
lacked the skills the position required because he was never given the opportunity to present
his qualifications at an interview.  Moreover, Elwell asserts that the job posting for which he
tailored the materials he submitted did not indicate that the  position required “technical
knowledge of energy scheduling and reconciliation, the tariff structure within the Pennsylvania,
New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) power grid, factors that lead to power flow disruptions, and
coordination and drafting of contracts with alternative electric suppliers.” App. at 232, Krall
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Decl.  
The District Court properly rejected this argument on the basis that Elwell failed to
introduce evidence that age discrimination more likely motivated the hiring choice and failed
to demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistences, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence[.]’” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  Because Elwell did not show that the reasons
advanced for the  hiring of a candidate possessing the skills sought were a pretext for age
discrimination, he failed to carry his burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework and
dismissal of his claim regarding the Supervising Engineer position was appropriate. 
C.  SOF Team Leader Position
Finally, the Court addresses Elwell’s contention that the District Court erred in
dismissing his claim of age discrimination arising out of his nonselection for the SOF Team
Leader position.  Assuming, without deciding, that nonselection for this project leadership role
amounted to an “adverse employment action,” Elwell’s claim fails as it boils down to his
assertion that the candidate selected proved to be a disappointing choice and that he could have
done a better job.  Michael Sobeck, Defendant’s employee who made the hiring decision with
respect to this position, asserted that he did not choose Elwell for the job because his staff
recommended against his selection due to a lack of confidence in Elwell’s leadership and
management skills and because Elwell had expressed doubts about the team’s ability to
complete the project.  While Elwell asserted that he was the logical choice for the position,
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he did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he was discriminated
against because of his age.  We observe that Elwell’s case is further weakened by the fact that
Sobeck was fifty years old at the time he made his hiring choice.  See App. at 207; Dungee v.
Northeast Foods, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 682, 688 n. 3 (D. N.J. 1996) (citing cases that hold that
a plaintiff’s ability to raise an inference of discrimination is hampered when the decision
maker is a member of the plaintiff’s protected class).
IV.  Conclusion
After carefully considering the arguments discussed above and all other arguments
advanced by the Appellant in support of his assertion that the District Court erred in dismissing
his claims on summary judgment, we affirm the District Court’s decision. 
                                                             
TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
By the Court, 
           /s/ Julio M. Fuentes
                                                                                         Circuit Judge      
